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NOTES ON ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
Lyn.w C~TAI~x Y.
Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
1. EQuIraUmi OF CAm BEFORE GOD.
We can best work out notions of Right, Justice, Duty, in terms
of Balance, not in terms of Authority and Command. The start
is with equilibrium. There are three factors, the two ends and the
holder of the scales. The state of the two ends in equilibrium is
Right; when equilibrium is disturbed, the state is Wrong. When
there is disturbance of equilibrium, there is vibration until equilib-
rium is restored. Thus God wills the return to balance, and eventu-
ally restores it.
When the balance is disturbed, one of the ends is outweighed,
he is wronged, a wrong is done him. As God wills that the balance
be restored, one wronged has a claim before God to be restored to
equilibrium; and a claim before God is a Right. Where there is
equilibrium of conditions of continuance of life as between man and
man, there is a condition in human relation called Justice. As God
wills the restoration to balance, there is botween man and man an
obligation to restore called Duty. A thwarted Right gives rise to the
vibration or desire to have the balance restored which is the source
of evil motive.
The apprehension constant in consciousness that between a man
and his neighbor there exists equality in claim before God constitutes
a Sense of Justice. All voluntary action is to be limited by justice.
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The morality of an act is to be determined by justice. To preserve
the balance of the equilibrium of justice is a duty. A violation of
justice is followed by retribution to God and to the wronged neigh-
bor. To restore the balance to equilibrium is a duty. Claim to re-
storation is a right, That which one may demand of right is due.
Thus Justice, Right, Duty and Due are moral concepts.
The State translates moral concepts into rules for human con-
duct, or laws. 'When the moral concepts are translated into rules by
the state, the rules are moral; for no subject can question the author-
ity or the omniscience of the State as the interpreter of the will of
God. The function of the State is to preserve the balance of equality
of claim before God. It accomplishes this when the balance is dis-
turbed by exacting retribution to the State or to the person wronged,
or to both. The exercise of this function by the State is the Admin-
istration of Justice.
Administration of Justice means Abstract or Moral Justice. The
rules or laws which are formed and prescribed by the State are the
State's interpretation of moral justice, and constitute the rules of
fulfillment of moral justice in civil conduct. These rules are no less
moral because they are differentiated and called Legal Justice or
Law. According to the Institutes of Justinian 1, i, see. i, 3, "Justice
is the set and constant purpose which gives to every man his due."
But it would seem that, from the failure of any reference to the
holder of the scales, this set and constant purpose in human conscious-
ness is acquired and not instinctive. Kant, Rechtslehre, xxx1,
introduces this -third term: "Right is therefore the sum of the condi-
tions under which the will of one can be brought into harmony with
the will of another according to a universal law of freedom. Every
act is right which, in itself, or in accordance with its maxim, can
co-exist with the freedom of the will of each and all according to
a universal law." Which may fairly be interpreted that where there
are two individuals and freedom is absolute, right is in a standoff
or balance between the two. Right, therefore, is a balance or state of
equilibrium between the freedom of A and the freedom of B, value
and worth being measured by the standard of the holder of the
scales.
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2. THE ADnqMiSTaTION Or JUSTICE.
Consider these figures. (1) the elements (a) an administrator
clothed with authority and power; (b) justice or equal balance as
the standard; (c) an act of a human being affecting his neighbor.
(2) Weigh the act in the scales of justice. (3) Measure the morality
of the particular act by comparison with the abstract or general mor-
ality. (4) Ascertain the fact of disturbance, measure the degree of
variation, and restore -the balance by exacting retribution. Note that
inequality and injustice are conditions of unrest and instability, and
the whole economy of the universe will be brought to restore the
equilibrium.
In the administration of Justice, there must be two separate
authorities in the State: (1) To establish and declare the form of the
Rules of Conduct: (2) To determine and enforce their applicability
to particular situations. (Legislative and Administrative.)
The Legislative Authority prescribes the form of the Rule, but
the Administrative Authority weighs the applicability of the Rule in
the Form prescribed to the particular facts and, to that end, inter-
prets the Rule.
The Administrator holds the balance and keeps it in Equilib-
rium. On one end is Abstract Morality (which includes the Legisla-
tive Form) ; on the other is the Morality of the particular act. The
administrator is the Judge, and a State oT Equilibrium is a state of
Justice, or Rightness, or Righteousness.
3. Tim CoMMoN LAw.
A state of Justice exists in the abstract, apart from and superior
to the consciousness of the Judge, but he is the interpreter and spokes-
man; therefore, Right is in the breast of the Judge. The Judges under
the Civil System are not subject to any control but their own con-
sciousness; under the Common Law System the Judges are bound by
a superior Morality, which is called the Common Law and is found in
the Precedents and Maxims.
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The term, the Common Law, has also a wider signification than
in its application specifically to the English Law. In Salmond, Juris-
prudence, 6th Edition, p. 45, these quotations are given:
Aristotle: "Law is either universal or special. Special law con-
sists of the written enactments by which men are governed. The
universal law consists of those unwritten rules which are recognized
among all men." "Right and wrong have been defined by reference
to two kinds of law. . . . Special law is that which is estab-
lished by each people for itself. . . . The Universal law is that
which is conformable merely to nature."
Gaius: "All people-that are ruled by laws and customs observe
partly law peculiar to themselves and partly law common to all
mankind. That which any people has established for itself is called
jns civile as being law peculiar to that state. But -that law which
natural reason establishes among all mankind is observed equally by
all peoples, and is for that reason called jus gentium."
Justinian: "Natural law which is observed equally in all nations,
being established by divine providence, remains settled and immutable:
but that law which each state has established for itself has often
changed either by legislation or by the tacit consent of the people."
Hooker: "The law of reason or human nature is that which
men by discourse of natural reason have rightly found out them-
selves to be all forever bound unto in their actions."
Christian Thomasius: "Natural law is a divine law, written in
the hearts of all men, obliging them to do those things which are
necessarily conservant to the rational nature of mankind, and to
refrain from these things which are repugnant to it."
Speaking of Natural Law, Salmond says, Jurisprudence, Gth edi-
tion, p. 45: "Natural Law has received many other names expressive
of its divers qualities and aspects. . . . It is also the Unwritten
Law, as being written not on brazen tablets or on pillars of stone, but
solely by the finger of nature in the hearts of men. It is also the
Universal or Common Law as being of universal validity, the same
in all places and binding on all peoples and not one thing at Athens
and another at Rome, as are the civil laws of states . . . lastly,
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in modern times we find it termed the Moral Law, as being the 'ex-
pression of the principles of Morality." "The term law as applied
to the principles of natural justice, brings with it certain misleading
associations-suggestion of command, imposition, external authority,
legislation-which are not in harmony with the moral philosophy of
the present day."
But in the English and American system, -the Unwritten, the
Common Law, is that system of Justice and Morality which is found
in the Judicial Precedents, Legislative Enactments, and Books of
Authority of the English-speaking people.
4. MUmCtPAt LAw.
It seems to be a false figure to apply the term Law to Morality
at all. Certainly it has a different meaning when used in the ex-
pressions. "Moral Law," "Universal Law," "Common Law." "Un-
written Law," on the one hand, and "Mlunicipal Law" on the other.
In the last three is the suggestion of imposition by ,the strong hand,
of command of a superior force, of legislation. None of these is con-
sistent with a mere course of existence which is of the nature of the
object affected. Therefore, extracts from Blackstone and other writers
are to be read as using figures and modes of expression taken from
imperialism, and not from the theory of a modern American state.
Blackstone's definition of Municipal Law, I Comm., 44-46, is ap-
plicable in the abstract. "A rule of civil conduct prescribed by the
Supreme power in a state commanding what is right and prohibiting
what is wrong." When a particular state is considered, the expres-
sion would be properly the Municipal Law. The Municipal Law is a
body of Rules of Civil Conduct obtained in a particular state. The
Mlunicipal Law of Kentucky is that body of Rules of Civil Conduct
which the people of Kentucky have ordained for their own govern-
ince.
A law is necessarily a Rule as set out by Blackstone; also, Munic-
ipal law applies only to civil conduct. Such a Rule has the character
of a law only when it is ordained as such by the supreme power, and
it is also necessary to its character as a law that it shall be notified
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to the people subject to it. But apparently, he takes the view that
a Law is a Command of the state; but it is to be noticed further that
he defines Right and Wrong by defining the specific rights and
wrongs which the state will consider in the administration of Justice.
Jenks, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages, points out that
there are "Sources" of Law, or authority for law, other than the
state's command.
Gray, Nature and Sources of Law, pp. 191-230, contends that the
Law is composed of the rules which the Courts lay down for the de-
termination of legal rights and duties. He cites Austin, "that the
law is the command of the state." Savigny, that the courts apply
those rules which have previously existed in the common conscious.
ness of the people; and Carter, that the judges are the discoverers,
not the creators of the law.
5. Posrvn LAw.
Robertson, Elements of American Jurisprudence. p. 4, points out
the difference between an essential order of being appearing in ex-
istence, and a command. "A rule may be imposed by one being upon
another being in either of two ways (1) By immediately and irresist-
ibly controlling the nature, attributes, or conduct of the subject-
being; (2) By commanding the subject-being how to act or forbear.
The latter mode is possible only when the subject-being possesses
reason and will, and when its actions and forbearances are under its
own control. Thus the eternal law governs all beings, actions and
events, except the purely voluntary acts in the second method. To
the imposition of a rule in" the second method it is necessary that
the rule should be expressed and promulgated; that is, that it should
be positively prescribed and communicated by the law-giver to the
rational subject-being in a manner intelligible to him and so become
a recognized and practical guide of life and conduct. This form of
law is known as a "Positive law and is regarded by many writers as
the only form to which the name 'law' can be properly applied."
Illustrations of the first class of rules are, Water seeks its level;
the peach falls; the wind bloweth where it listeth; sparks fly up-
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ward. Of the second class are the Ten Commandments; the Twelve
Tables.
Amos, Science of Laiv, 43-45, contends that law (what does he
mean by the term'?) does not and cannot cover the field of morality so
as to be directly in furtherance of morality, but that it does further
morality indirectly. Thus, law may create and define relations, but
the observance of the duties of such relations is very largely under
the sanctions of morality and not of law. Law does declare what
agreement shall be enforcible, but that element in the obligation of
agreement which we call character the law does not touch. But law
does define the field with which moral agencies work. "Thus it is the
constant reminder to every man of the equal claim of his neighbor,
and so restrains him.
Law, does secure, moreover, according to Amos, to individuals
"a free field" of undisturbed life and of work, that is, personal
liberty. It is a guard against invasion of liberty that law exerts most
effectually an influence in support of morality, since men cannot be
moral unless they are free.
6. FRE FIELD OF Lum AN WoRK.
The "Free field of undisturbed work and life," in the phrase of
Amos, is a very rich conception. Perhaps it can be elaborated into
a field in which a human being is free of restraints and limitations
upon the enjoyment of continued existence, and the exercise of his
faculties and capabilities in the pursit of his own desires. The con-
ception is that of Liberty. This conception can best be arrived at by
considering the situation of a man caught in a cane brake. He can-
not move; he perishes because he is killed by enemies, or cannot obtain
food. But suppose he can move slightly in place; he enlarges the
space in which he is free to move by cutting down the cane around
him; he fences in -the place he has thus cleared against enemies, and
within it, he is free to move and seek his food. The cleared space is
his liberty, because there he is secure. Thus Liberty is a space within
which an individual or a society is free to move and enjoy continued
existence. The physical expanse which we call Kentucky is the
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Liberty of every citizen of Kentucky. Within that domain he is
free to move and continue to live; this is his birthright. But his free-
dom in these respects is not without the limitation of the equal claim
of every other citizen. His degree of freedom is that scheme of free-
dom which the members of the political society of Kentucky have
devised and ordained for every citizen.
We have made the interior expanse of Kentucky comparatively
secure against enemies of all sorts. But human beings and the
individual claims and wills of human beings still exist and en-
compass and press upon the man like the stalks of cane. These
he cannot cut down and clear out of his way; moreover, they are
not stationary, but moving and elusive. The problem is to achieve
and make secure to the man a liberty of moving and living which is
consistent with an equal liberty of moving aiad living in the same
space enjoyed by every other individual at the same time; where
the freedom of moving and living at will of the one does not en-
oroach upon the equal freedom of the other to move and live at will,
both being in exactly the same situation. Thus it is, to devise a
scheme of freedom of living and moving whereby two men may occupy
the same space at the same time, yet each tu be equally free to live
and work.
If we dismiss the figure of a physical, geographical expanse
and conjure up for contemplation an imaginary region, a field,
where the hearts of numberless men are eternally at work imagin-
ing and devising, each pursuing its own designs and following its
own' desires, crossing and recrossing each other, coming into con-
flict or here and there proceeding in company, having each the
grand objective to continue' existence, and to that end to acquire
for his own use as great a portion of the common available supply
of food as possible, then we get a conception of the region which
is made secure by fencing out enemies but yet has to be regulated
within; where order has to be brought out of chaos. When order has
been established and two men continue to live side by side and
pursue their own hearts' desire without extinguishingeach other,
then that imaginary region of suspended conflict is the Liberty
of the two men and their state is that of Civil Liberty. Each is
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under restraint as to the indulgence of his liberty to move; but
their state as respects the degree of absence of restraint is that of
Freedom. In the state of Freedom, the liberty to move at will has
become the liberty to move in zig-zags. A straight course being
of right until another will and right are encountered, when the
course must be veered at such an angle as may be necessary to avoid
a clash.
Perfect freedom is the state of a man within his liberty who is
not under any control or direction as to his movements except the
"devices and desires of his own heart," that is, of a human being
alone within a liberty of his own achievement, from which the ob-
stacles of all other human wills are excluded. (Compare Robinson
Crusoe.)
The radical idea in Liberty is an environment which is pro-
pitious towards the exercise by a human being of- his capabilities;
m Freedom, it is the absence of restraints upon the realization in
action and achievement of the devices of his own heart.
7. THE RESTRAINT OF JUSTICE.
Under our system, life is given of God, and its continued ex-
istence is a right given of God. The right to continued existence
imparts the right to be secure in person, and the right to exercise
our capabilities in acquiring food and in improving our condition.
But the right of continued existence, since the time when a state
of Civil Liberty was established, has become modified by the require-
ment that its conditions shall be such as are consistent with Right
Reason and with Justice; Right Reason being he ordained course or
direction of Self-determination, and Justice being the ordained
course, or line of direction of self-determination restrained within
the requirements of the conditions of a state of Civil Liberty. A
sense of Right, Reason and a sense of Justice are faculties in every
human being, but not of equal power and development in all persons.
It is -necessary to have a standard of each by which to measure and
test the morality of individual human actions. The state pre-
scribes the standard for each action, and the state's prescriptions
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we call laws. A legal right is that liberty of progressive existence,
and of working, of moving and taking and holding, which results
to the individual human being after the conditions of his life have
been modified, and after the exercise of his capabilities has been re-
stricted by limitations which arise out of the coexistence and con-
temporaneous enjoyment of the same conditions and the exercise of
the same capabilities by other individuals. Thus every law is an
authoritative declaration of the limits which reason and justice im-
pose upon the liberty of exercising the natural capabilities.
The capability to move over the earth's surface at will was in
the case of Robinson Crusoe, absolute in the exercise before the ad-
vent of Friday, but it was by no means absolute after that happening.
After the appearance of Friday the exercise of the capability be-
came a liberty; that is, it became a right or just claim, against
Friday. Given a large space and only one other human being the
rights of each can be easily worked out; perhaps, if the space is
sufficiently large, there could be an apportionment. But if the
space is common to many humans, then the moving leaves a tortuous
trace behind. The same figure applied to the course of an individ-
ual's movements in the field of Civil Liberty pursuing his own de-
vices and desires would exhibit the same tortuous track or wake.
We can only speak of the tract or wake left behind, because there is
no beaten path to follow, the man must feel his own way with tenta-
cles out in front. His tentacles would notify him of frequent and
numerous obstacles, which, instead of cane stalks, would be the equal
rights and claims of his neighbor. Each right and claim of each
neighbor demands of him an obligation of heed and regard. That
obligation calls for a punctilious and constant bearing or course of
conduct consisting in the exercise of solicitous care and forethought
in avoiding such acts and doings, and such modes of acting and do-
ing as will directly or consequentially cause unnecessary interfer-
ence with the neighbor's right and in doing such acts or re-
sorting to measures which will prevent unnecessary interference
with the neighbor's right. This is, indeed, the essence of Civil Lib-
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erty. The neighbor's right to security against him imposes upon
him the duty to respect that security both by doing and by refraining
from doing, and by modification of conduct.
8. DISTURBANCE OF JUSTICE.
In prescribing what conduct shall be legally wrongful, the law
notices both voluntary actions -and also omissions to act, the latter
being, in some situations, evidence of a culpable mind. Acts which
constitutes breaches of lkw are classified as, (1) wrongs, (a) crimes,
(b) torts; (2) breaches of contract; (3) breaches of quasi-con-
tractual obligations.
A wrong is an enlargement or expansion of the wrongdoer's
liberty, or the improper assumption of a liberty, either in deroga-
tion of the liberty of another. It is wrongful in that according to
the standard of the law, it is destructive of the peace and dignity
of organized society, or of the security of another in the enjoyment
of his rights of progressive continued existence, or of his rights of
doing, taking and holding. In so far as a wrong is destructive of
the peace and dignity of organized society, it is a "crime." Other
wrongs are "torts." Breach of contract is a special form of un-
lawful act whose definition, form, and obligation are fixed by pos-
itive rule. There is no contract unless the definition is exactly ful-
filled, and unless the prescribed form is observed and there is no
other legal obligation than the one laid in the law. Breach of
Quasi-Confractual obligation is a species of unlawful act similar in
its nature to tort in that it is in derogation of another's right and
similar in its nature ito breach of contract, since it is a refusal to
render a fixed sum of money under circumstances from which the
law recognizes a right to receive that sum. It is of an equitable
nature, in process of growth, and not yet fully reduced to definition
and form.
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9. Tmi JusTIcE OF LAW.
Municipal law consists of a body of rules of Civil Conduct whose
obligation is enforced by a human sanction. Moral obligations are
not enforced by any hunman sanctions prescribed by law. The sanc-
tion of the law is the restoration of equilibrium, that is, the perform-
ance of the obligation of Justice. The sanction of moral obligations
is death. Eve was told that if she should eat the fruit, she would
surely die.
Blackstone contends that no human law is a valid rule.if it
contradicts or be in conflict with the Moral law. But he does not
contend that a subject is at liberty to disregard the law if in his
conscience it violates the moral law. The individual is not the judge
of what is the moral law as a standard-by which to criticise the
human law. That authority is exclusively in the state; in the Leg-
islature as to positive enactments, and in the courts as to the Com-
mon law. But, there are limitations upon the power and authority of
the state to impose restrictions upon the individual's conduct. Jus-
tice Miller points out in Loan Association ofk Topeka that certain
limitations upon legislative authority exist and have their source in
the essential nature of free government, such as in the United States.
His position is that there is a sort of moral law of states which will
be recognized by the courts. They will declare void such positive
enactments as violate the essential nature of free government. And
Coke declares that by the Common Law a positive enactment which is
against common right and reason, or is repugnant in itself, or is im-
possible to be performed is void; as an enactment that a man shall
be judge in his own cause. Lord Holt laid it down in City of London
vs. Wood, that an act of the legislature can do no wrong, altho- h it
may "do several things that look pretty odd." By which hr -nea-
that the fact that the law is unethical does not make it void, nor
that it is oppressive and unwise or unmoral; but it will be void if it
undertakes to do or bring about that which according to the eternal
fitness of things it is impossible should exist, as that a man be
judge in his own case.
